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0. Introduction 
 
At Phaedo 86b7–c2 Plato makes Simmias, one of Socrates’ main interlocutors 
in the dialogue, present the theory that the soul is the ‘blend’ (κρᾶσις) and 
‘attunement’ (ἁρμονία) of the hot, cold, dry, wet and certain other such things that 
make taut and hold together the body.1 According to this theory, when those things 
are properly and proportionately held together, the soul exists as a sort of 
attunement; when, on the other hand, they are improperly and disproportionately 
loosened or tautened because of illness or for some other reasons, the soul perishes 
at once, just like other sorts of attunement. Simmias thus casts serious doubt upon 
Socrates’ previous arguments in the dialogue that the soul is immortal. 
Who originated this attunement theory of the soul is a historical conundrum: 
there is no reliable evidence for identifying its authorship. Among the older thinkers, 
however, there is one attribution that receives some support from ancient writers: the 
Pythagoreans, especially Philolaus. For example, Plotinus, Olympiodorus and 
Philoponus discuss the view that the soul is an attunement by reference to the 
Pythagoreans;2 Macrobius, more specifically, reports that Pythagoras and Philolaus 
said that the soul was an attunement. 3  However, Plotinus and Philoponus, 
presumably bearing in mind Plato’s arguments against the attunement theory in the 
Phaedo, takes pains to distinguish the Pythagorean attunement theory from the one 
Simmias introduces in our passage, that the soul is the attunement of bodily 
elements. Therefore, their reports constitute little evidence for, or rather evidence 
against, the view that Simmias’ attunement theory derives from the Pythagoreans.4 
(Olympiodorus merely says that the doctrine of soul as an attunement was held by 
Simmias and certain Pythagoreans.) There is also good reason to doubt Macrobius’ 
report, aside from the fact that it is quite late. For Aristotle does not assign the 
                                                 
1 All translations of this paper are from Sedley and Long 2011. But they are occasionally modified 
where necessary for the clarity of exposition. 
2 Plot. IV 7.84; Olymp. in Phd. 10.2, 3–4 [Westerink 1976, vol. 1]; Phlp. in de An. 70, 5–18. 
3 DK 44A23.  
4 Cf. Gottschalk 1971, 192–3. 
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attunement theory to the Pythagoreans, but introduces it as a view held by ‘many’ 
(de An. 1.4, 407b27–32) or ‘many of the wise’ (Pol. 8.5, 1340b17–19). And he 
ascribes basically different views of the soul to the Pythagoreans (de An. 1.2, 
404a16–20, 407b20–23). If Macrobius’ report were accurate, it would be strange 
that Aristotle does not mention the doctrine in question as Pythagorean. 
Despite all this tenuous doxographical evidence, however, many modern 
scholars have accepted the Pythagorean origin of Simmias’ attunement theory of the 
soul, mainly because they think that the Phaedo gives us enough evidence for the 
attribution of the theory to Philolaus.5 At 61d6–7, for instance, Simmias and Cebes, 
who are both Thebans, are said to have been acquainted with Philolaus in their city; 
at 88d1–6 Plato makes Echecrates, who is reported by Diogenes Laertius to have 
been a Pythagorean and disciple of Philolaus, express the feeling that Simmias’ 
attunement theory of the soul has an extraordinary attraction.6 At 86b7, moreover, 
Simmias claims that ‘we’ take the soul to be something like an attunement, and at 
92d1–2 that he accepted the attunement theory of the soul just as ‘most people’ do; 
by ‘we’ and ‘most people’ those scholars take him to mean the Pythagoreans, 
including Philolaus. For those reasons Simmias is widely supposed to be acting as 
their spokesman in the dialogue. It is highly likely that Macrobius’ report likewise 
derived from reading those passages in the Phaedo. The issue then boils down to the 
question whether the dialogue really corroborates the Pythagorean origin of 
Simmias’ attunement theory of the soul. 
In this paper I challenge this common reading of the dialogue, that Simmias’ 
attunement theory of the soul is to be credited to the Pythagoreans or Philolaus, by 
carefully examining those passages in the Phaedo that are assumed to support the 
view.7 I share with some other commentators the opinion that he is not depicted as a 
representative of a specific philosopher or school, but rather as that of ordinary 
                                                 
5 Barnes 1979, 386–91; Burnet 1911, 82; Caston 1997, 319–23; Cornford 1922, 145–50; Guthrie 
1962, vol.1, 306–19; Horky 2013, 171; Sedley 1995, 11; Sedley and Long 2011, 78, n. 41; Young 
2013, 474, n. 17. Cf. Huffman 1993, 326–32, who concludes that we have no reliable external 
evidence that Philolaus thought that the soul was an attunement, but nevertheless goes on to argue 
that his theory of the soul would not have been so different from what Simmias describes in the 
Phaedo. 
6 D.L. 8.46. Cf. Iamb. VP 251. 
7 Gottschalk 1971, 193–4 briefly summarises various suggestions about the authorship of Simmias’ 
attunement theory: the Eleatics, Empedocles, Alcmaeon, the Sicilian medical school and Heraclitus. 
Rowett 2017, 373–87 has recently argued that the theory derives from Heraclitus. 
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educated people, if not of the man in the street.8 They, however, have not gone on to 
explain why Simmias’ attunement theory of the soul is said in the dialogue to have 
attracted many people, which is a question crucial to assessing its nature as a 
philosophical theory. It seems to me that we can have a fairly clear answer to the 
question by examining the wider context in which Simmias’ attunement theory is 
introduced, especially its relation to Socrates’ preceding argument, the affinity 
argument. If my reading of the relevant passages is correct, then the attunement 
theory of the soul as presented in the dialogue is hardly based on profound 
theoretical grounds. Plato introduces it as one of the popular beliefs that appeal only 
to apparent plausibility in the intellectual atmosphere where materialistic views of 
the world had become dominant. It is therefore wrong to use the dialogue as 
evidence for identifying the philosophical authorship of the theory; trying to do so 
will rather distort what Plato intends to convey about the nature of Simmias’ 
attunement theory of the soul, which I shall focus on clarifying in the paper. 
 
1. Criticisms of the Pythagorean Origin 
 
The first point to discuss is an obvious problem with attributing Simmias’ 
attunement theory of the soul to the Pythagoreans, who believed in the 
transmigration and immortality of the soul. Simmias introduces the theory to object 
to Socrates that the soul, if a sort of attunement, will perish straightaway when the 
body whose elements constitute that attunement is destructed. It is hard to believe 
that any Pythagorean thinker could endorse a theory that clearly implies the 
mortality of the soul. This problem will simply go away if we do not suppose that 
Simmias’ theory is Pythagorean. However, scholars have attempted to resolve the 
issue broadly in two different ways. 
Some have thought it possible for Philolaus to have rejected immortality, 
because the fact that he was a Pythagorean does not necessarily mean that he 
accepted transmigration and immortality, and we do not have external sources that 
explicitly confirm his acceptance. In view of the implication of Simmias’ attunement 
theory, therefore, they have concluded that Philolaus actually forsook the 
Pythagorean orthodoxy. 9  It seems to me, however, that the Phaedo strongly 
indicates that he believed in the existence of the afterlife. At 61e6–8 Cebes reports 
                                                 
8 Archer-Hind 1894, 105–6; Gallop 1975, 148; Hackforth 1955, 101–3. Rowe 1993, 6–7, 204 also 
rejects that Simmias is treated as Pythagorean, but thinks that Simmias’ attunement theory is based on 
some technical discussion in the Platonic circle. 
9 Huffman 1993, 330; McKirahan 2016, 67, 69. 
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that Philolaus preached against suicide. But since he also says that he did not hear 
anything clear about it from him (61d8, e8–9), all that is clear from this passage is 
the mere fact that Philolaus prohibited suicide for some reason. The opponents have 
therefore argued that, since prohibiting suicide does not logically imply supporting 
the existence of the afterlife, Philolaus could abandon the doctrine of transmigration 
and immortality. Given the context, however, this reading is highly implausible. For 
the prohibition on suicide is brought up for discussion when Socrates has claimed 
that Evenus, if he is a philosopher, will be willing ‘to follow’ (ἕπεσθαι) someone 
who is dying, namely Socrates (61c2–d5); Socrates then remarks at 61d9–e3 that he 
will happily tell Cebes about issues related to suicide because it is appropriate for 
someone who is about ‘to travel there’ (ἐκεῖσε ἀποδημεῖν), namely Socrates, to 
consider thoroughly and tell stories about what the stay there is like. As you see, the 
subject of forbidding suicide is closely intertwined to that of the posthumous fate of 
the soul. It would therefore be rather odd to mention Philolaus in this context, if 
Plato assumed him to be the originator of Simmias’ attunement theory. In fact, 
Socrates goes on to explain that the reason for banning suicide is that human beings 
are one of the gods’ possessions and in a sort of prison, and therefore that one must 
not release oneself from it or run away (62b3–9). This claim clearly assumes that the 
soul continues to exist after it is separated from the body. It is true that he introduces 
such an esoteric doctrine simply as hearsay (ἐξ ἀκοῆς, 61d9–10) and what is said in 
secret accounts (ἀπορρήτοις, 62b2–3), not connected to Philolaus. I therefore 
agree that the passage cannot be used as evidence that Philolaus endorsed that 
specific doctrine.10 My claim, however, is that the present context that presupposes 
the existence of the afterlife makes it extremely unnatural, if not impossible, to 
suppose that Plato thought of him as endorsing a theory that implies the immediate 
destruction of the soul after death, and therefore as preaching against suicide for 
reasons that have nothing to do with the soul’s survival after death, such as the 
reason that this single life is invaluable, and so on. 
Another solution that has been suggested in the literature is to suppose that 
Philolaus could endorse both Simmias’ attunement theory and the immortality of the 
soul, either because he did not realize the incompatibility between them, which was 
first exposed in the Phaedo,11 or because he thought that what can survive after 
                                                 
10 Cf. DK 44B14, 15. Huffman 1993, 402–10 offers a detailed discussion of why these fragments are 
spurious. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss their authenticity, but my point does not rely 
on them being genuine. 
11 Sedley 1995, 12–13. This possibility is also mentioned by Burkert 1972, 272. 
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death is different from the soul that is an attunement.12 It seems to me, however, that 
neither option is convincing. As for the former, Plato takes it for granted that taking 
the soul as an attunement straightforwardly entails that it perishes immediately after 
death. There is no inkling in the dialogue that there may be a sort of attunement that 
could survive death. Socrates’ sole focus in dealing with Simmias’ objection is 
therefore to establish that the soul is not an attunement at all, rather than that it is not 
the sort of attunement Simmias presents it as. It is hard to suppose that Philolaus was 
confused about, or unaware of, the direct relation of the attunement theory to the 
mortality of the soul that is treated in the dialogue as self-evident. The second option, 
on the other hand, is supported by the fact that in fragment 13 Philolaus connects the 
soul (ψυχή) to the heart, and intellect (νοῦς) to the head. The idea is that he might 
have thought that, even though ψυχή perishes at death, some other psychic element 
like νοῦς still survives and transmigrates. I do not mean to deny that Philolaus 
himself could make that distinction, avoiding the obvious contradiction between the 
attunement theory of ψυχή and his belief in transmigration and immortality. My 
point, however, is that this distinction is well beyond what Simmias offers in the 
Phaedo, and that the dialogue cannot be read as attacking the concept of that 
immortal psychic element which is different from ψυχή as a material life-principle. 
At 91e5–92e4 Socrates gives his first reply to Simmias’ objection, by means of the 
theory of recollection. The gist of his argument here is that, while the theory of 
recollection entails that the soul existed before the body it enters comes into 
existence, an attunement cannot exist before its constituents come into existence. 
This argument clearly suggests that the discussants presuppose that a psychic 
element that may transmigrate is identical with the attunement in question. If Plato 
had meant to criticize Philolaus’ idea of a separate psychic element that survives, 
however, this identification would make no sense, because the argument is utterly 
inefficacious against those who distinguish between the psychic element that existed 
before birth and the soul as an attunement that came into existence after birth. 
The second point to discuss is Simmias’ remark at 92c11–d2 that he accepted 
the attunement theory of the soul for the same reason that ‘most people believe it’ 
(τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις). As long as we take it at face value, it is natural 
to suppose that by ‘most people’ he refers to a wider range of people than the 
Pythagoreans. And it follows from this that ‘we’ at 86b7, corresponding with ‘most 
people’, refers to general intellectuals rather than members of a specific 
philosophical school. What is important here is that, when introducing the 
                                                 
12 Huffman 1993, 330–2. 
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attunement theory, Simmias is guessing that Socrates is already aware that he 
supports it along with the others he refers to by ‘we’ (86b6). It implies that Socrates 
somehow learned or noticed their endorsement of the attunement theory on an 
earlier occasion.13 It is true that he knows that Philolaus stayed with Simmias and 
Cebes for a certain period, mentioned at 61d6–7. Given, however, that Cebes there 
professes their ignorance of Philolaus’ view about the prohibition on suicide, it is 
difficult to suppose that his mere knowledge of Philolaus’ sojourn with them has led 
to his awareness that Simmias is about to present a Pythagorean psychology. At 
64c4–9, more importantly, where Socrates asks Simmias whether he is satisfied with 
the definition of death as the separation of the soul from the body, Simmias shows 
no hesitation in accepting it, despite its obvious implication that the soul continues 
to exist independently of the body. He then goes on to act as an interlocutor loyal to 
Socrates’ guidance until Cebes starts objecting to Socrates at 69e5 that the soul may 
perish when separated from the body. Since Socrates’ definition of death is hardly 
compatible with the immediate destruction of the soul after death, it seems that 
Simmias, down to that point of the dialogue (69e5), has neither thought consciously 
of the attunement theory himself, even if he has implicitly endorsed it all along, nor 
given Socrates any clue to his endorsement of it. This also excludes the possibility 
that the direct reason for Simmias’ guess that Socrates anticipates his introduction of 
the attunement theory is supposed to be their exchange(s) had outside the dialogue. 
It emerges from my observation so far that there needs to be some indication that 
Simmias may put forward a theory of the soul that implies its mortality, after that 
point of discussion within the dialogue. 
A plausible sign, I suggest, is the two main interlocutors’ constant anxiety about 
the soul’s dissipation after death, introduced first at 69e5–70b4. After Socrates has 
expressed his hope for an afterlife, Cebes objects to him that people strongly doubt 
that the soul can be detached from the body because they think that, once the soul is 
separated from the body, it is dissipated like breath or smoke, flies away in all 
                                                 
13 Cf. Rowe 1993, 204–5. Simmias says, ‘In actual fact, Socrates, I think that you yourself are well 
aware that we take the soul to be something of precisely this kind’ 
(καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτόν σε τοῦτο ἐντεθυμῆσθαι, ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τ
ι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι). Rowett 2017, 379–83 has recently argued that the 
passage means that Socrates himself too once took the view Simmias is about to introduce because 
τοῦτο refers to the attunement theory rather than to the ὅτι clause as a whole. But if so, the perfect 
tense of the word ἐντεθυμῆσθαι would mean that Socrates still endorses the theory now, which 
clearly does not match the context. I do not think plausible Rowett’s claim that the perfect tense 
might suggest Simmias’ inference that Socrates has now abandoned such a naturalistic view as the 
attunement theory. 
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directions, and isn’t anything anywhere (70a7). In response to this doubt, Socrates 
puts forward the cyclical argument and recollection argument to prove that the soul 
can exist without the body. Simmias insists, however, that Cebes’ worry about the 
soul’s dissipation, which is shared with most people (τὸ τῶν πολλῶν), still stands, 
and Cebes confirms this opinion once again (77b3–c1; cf. 80d8–e1). 
Commentators often point out the similarity of their claim to the Homeric 
concept of the soul flying away like smoke after death (e.g. Il. 16. 856–7; 23. 100–1; 
103–4).14 However, more attention should be paid to the difference: at least in the 
cited passages, of which Plato would have undoubtedly been well aware (cf. R. 
386d–387a), Homer holds the view that the soul exists somewhere after death, 
especially in Hades, but both interlocutors express the fear that the soul may not 
exist anywhere after its dissipation.15 Some might object that Homer implies that the 
soul after death becomes witless, which can be seen as equivalent to ceasing to exist 
after death; and that, since Cebes also asks Socrates to prove that the soul keeps 
some power (δύναμιν) and wisdom (φρόνησιν) after death (70b4), his worry is 
still driven by the Homeric teaching.16 However, we cannot plausibly identify the 
soul’s existence with its possession of intelligence for the following reasons. Despite 
Cebes’ request to show that the soul retains intelligence after death, all the 
arguments Socrates makes for that specific point in the dialogue are the recollection 
argument, where souls are said to have had wisdom, separate from bodies, before 
entering human forms (76c11–12). Since this consequence, as we mentioned above, 
does not completely remove the interlocutors’ anxiety, Socrates would need another 
argument, if the Homeric idea were at stake, for the soul’s holding wisdom after 
death. Although he affirms at 77c6–d5 that immortality has already been proved if 
the recollection argument is combined with the cyclical argument (70b5–72d10), he 
does not mention the soul’s wisdom there. He starts the cyclical argument by 
reformulating Cebes’ worry simply into the question whether the soul exists in 
Hades or not (70c4–5), and concludes all its three sub-arguments by basically 
answering that the soul exists in Hades after death, respectively at 71e2, 72a6–8 and 
72d8–10. 17 Nor does Socrates touch on the problem of whether the soul keeps 
wisdom, in the final argument. The only point that is proved there is that the soul 
                                                 
14 Burnet 1911, 46; Rowe 1993, 152–3. 
15 At Ap. 40c8–10 Socrates ascribes the idea of transmigration to ‘what is said’ (τὰ λεγόμενα). Against 
Burnet 1924, 166–7, who thinks that the reference is to the mysteries, Stokes 1997, 191 and Slings 
1994, 384–5 maintain that it is to popular opinion. 
16 Burnet 1911, 46–7; Rowe 2007, 97–8. 
17 See Sedley 2012, 147–8. 
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simply exists in Hades (107a1). All this shows that whether the soul possesses 
wisdom after death or not is a secondary point, and that their worry derives from 
something different from such a traditional and religious view of the soul’s existence 
in Hades as seen in the Homeric poems. 
What, then, lies behind the interlocutors’ objection to Socrates’ view of the 
soul’s surviving death? The answer, I suggest, is hinted by the very fact that they 
repeatedly refer to people’s anxiety about the separability of the soul from the body, 
which is likely to have derived from some materialistic view of the soul that had 
become prevalent at that time. For the point of their worry is that the soul totally 
depends for its existence on the body. As we can see, this dependence of the soul on 
the body is exactly what Simmias emphasizes by the attunement theory. It is true 
that, when introducing the theory, he says that the attunement (of a lyre) is 
incorporeal (ἀσώματον, 85e5). 18  When characterizing the soul as the blend 
(κρᾶσις) and attunement of bodily elements (86c1–2), however, he appears to mean 
that the soul as an attunement is just the state of those bodily elements that are 
rightly mixed and tuned.19 His point thus implies that what we call a soul is nothing 
other than the body which is in a certain state, namely that it is not an entity separate 
from, or independent of, the body.20 Such a materialist understanding of the soul, I 
suppose, certainly paves the way for Socrates’ later identification of the soul as an 
attunement with a composite (σύνθετον, 92a7–b3, b7–8, 92e5–93a10). This 
identification should not be so problematic as often thought, 21  because if an 
attunement is identical with the body whose elements are tuned, then it is not strange 
to say that the attunement itself is a composite, just as the body is.22 In fact, Simmias 
does not show any sign of having changed his mind or of hesitating to accept 
Socrates’ materialist specification of the theory. And it is hardly likely that Socrates 
is surreptitiously altering Simmias’ original view for his sake, in the light of the 
pledge he has given immediately before, that he aims not to win a battle of words 
but to convince himself (91a6–b1). We can thus conclude that Simmias’ attunement 
                                                 
18  Gottschalk 1971, 180–1 claims that by ἁρμονία Simmias means the musical sounds a lyre 
produces, and therefore that the word ἁρμονία changes its meaning between that of the lyre and that 
of the soul. But, as Rowe 1993, 203 rightly points out, there should be no substantial change here 
because a lyre being in tune means its being able to produce musical sounds. Caston 1997, 321, n. 25 
also supposes that ἁρμονία means a tuned state in all Phaedo passages. 
19 Bostock 1986, 122–3; Gallop 1975, 148–9; Gottschalk 1971, 180–1; Hackforth 1955, 97–8, n. 1; 
Rowe 1993, 205. 
20 For the relation of Simmias’ attunement theory to supervenience, see Caston 1997, esp. 319–23. 
21 E.g. Hackforth 1955, 113, n. 1; Rowe 1993, 218. 
22 Young 2013, 479–81 offers a helpful discussion of how an attunement can be seen as a material 
object. 
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theory is fundamentally based on a materialistic view of the soul, and Socrates is 
faithfully describing it. 
On this reading, Cebes’ representation of prevalent apprehension about the 
soul’s dissipation and Simmias’ full approval of it would certainly have prepared the 
context in which Socrates was expected to anticipate that Simmias, referring to 
many others, would put forward the theory that the soul is the attunement of bodily 
elements. 
There is also good external evidence that the attunement theory had become 
wide-spread at that time due to a materialistic world view. In Laws X 888e–890a the 
Athenian introduces a doctrine of wise men (σοφῶν) that is said to have led young 
people to atheism. The doctrine is basically that all substances in the world, 
including the soul (cf. 891c), ultimately derive from the basic four elements (fire, 
water, earth and air), and that this generation process occurs in the way that the 
opposites whose characters inhere in the elements—the hot and cold, dry and wet, 
soft and hard, and so on—happen to be ‘attuned’ (ἁρμόττοντα, 889b6) and mixed 
together ‘by the blend of those opposites’ (τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κράσει, c1). Then 
the Athenian says, ‘young people have been embroiled in such a situation for a long 
time (πάλαι, 890b4)’ and ‘doctrines of this sort have been disseminated, as it were, 
over the entire human race (ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν ... ἀνθρώποις, 891b2–3)’. We can 
thus see from Laws X that it was quite common among young intellectuals in those 
days to regard not only the soul but all other substances in the world as deriving 
from the ‘attunement’ (ἁρμονία) and ‘blend’ (κρᾶσις) of opposites. It is striking 
that Simmias introduces the attunement of the soul in the Phaedo with these very 
terms. This strongly supports that he represents those young people who have 
discarded the traditional religious teachings under the great and far-reaching 
influence of a materialistic view of the world.  
 
2. The Relation to the Affinity Argument 
 
I have shown so far that Simmias’ belief in the attunement theory of the soul 
does not stem from the Pythagorean tradition. It does rather from pervading anxiety 
among contemporary educated people about the soul’s dissipation after death. This 
view will be reinforced by the fact that Simmias introduces the attunement theory in 
response to Socrates’ affinity argument at 78b4–80c1. There Simmias states, ‘one 
might make the same argument about attunement too’ (85e3–4), and ‘when someone 
either smashes the lyre or cuts and snaps its strings, what if one were to insist, with 
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the same argument as yours, that the attunement must still exist and not have 
perished?’ (86a4–6). By ‘the same argument’ he clearly refers to Socrates’ affinity 
argument. Simmias’ point is that if the soul is analogous to an attunement like a 
tuned lyre, even though it is invisible and divine, it must perish before those bodily 
elements of which it is composed, just as the attunement of the lyre perishes well 
before the lyre and its strings (86a6–b5). This criticism corresponds to the 
conclusion of the affinity argument that the soul will not perish immediately after 
death because even the body, which is visible and mortal, remains for a long time 
(80c2–e1). It will therefore be worth considering in detail what the nature of the 
affinity argument is, to know the grounds for Simmias’ attunement theory. 
The affinity argument goes as follows. Socrates starts by proposing to identify 
what kind of thing is liable (προσήκει) to be dissipated and what kind of thing is 
not, and then to consider which of the two kinds the soul is (78b4–10). (For the sake 
of simplicity, I will focus on the kind of thing the soul is said to be.) Following this 
proposal, he first points out that the incomposite is not liable to be divided (or 
dissipated), and that the unchanging is most likely (μάλιστα εἰκός) to be 
incomposite (c1–9). Then, I take it, he shows that the soul is analogous to the 
unchanging, from two points of view. First, the soul is more similar than the body to 
the invisible, and has Forms as its proper objects of knowledge (79a1–e8).23 Second, 
the soul, which naturally rules the body and plays the master, is similar to and 
resembles the divine (79e9–80a9).24 And he summarizes: 
 
‘Consider then, Cebes,’ he said, ‘whether from everything that has been said our 
results are as follows: that soul is most similar to that which is divine, immortal, 
intelligible, uniform, and incapable of being disintegrated, and which always 
stays in the same condition and state as itself; but that body, on the other hand, 
is most similar to what is human, mortal, resistant to intelligence, multiform, 
                                                 
23 This section might be divided into two parts, each of which independently contributes to the same 
conclusion that the soul is similar to the unchanging (Forms). However, Socrates’ remark at d10–e1 
‘given both what was said before and what we’re saying now’ may well suggest that they are in fact a 
continuous argument for the soul’s similarity to the unchanging. Or the second part might be playing 
the role of supporting the agreement established at 79a9–11, that the invisible is the unchanging. In 
either case, the aim of this section is to show that the soul is more similar to the unchanging, by 
appeal to its common features with Forms. 
24 The divine is probably regarded as belonging to the unchanging. The ways in which Socrates 
introduces this section, ‘In this way too’ (καὶ τῇδε, 79e9) and ‘Again on this basis’ (καὶ κατὰ 
ταῦτα αὖ, 80a2), indicate that he is still concerned with the same conclusion that the soul is 
analogous to the unchanging. See Rowe 1991, 470; 1993, 187. Cf. R. 380d1–381c9, where gods are 
said to be least subject to change. 
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able to be disintegrated, and never in the same state as itself. Besides these 
properties, my dear Cebes, can we name any other in respect of which it does 
not turn out in this same way?’ 
‘No, we can’t.’  
‘Very well. If all this is the case, isn’t body liable to be quickly disintegrated, 
but soul, on the other hand, liable to be altogether incapable of being 
disintegrated, or nearly so?’ 
‘Yes, of course.’                                  (80a10–c1, trans. modified) 
 
This summary of the argument is not faithful to the strategy Socrates mapped 
out at the beginning. His plan was to show that the soul belongs to the unchanging 
because the latter most likely belongs to the incomposite, which is not liable to be 
divided or dissipated. In the above passage, however, he appears to infer the 
conclusion that the soul is not liable to be disintegrated (indivisible or incapable of 
being dissipated),25 directly from the point he has established in the argument, that it 
is most similar to the unchanging. (He probably mentions the other properties as 
those possessed by Forms and/or the divine.26) But this direct inference is surely 
valid because something’s being always unchanging clearly entails its being not 
liable to be disintegrated (for disintegration implies a change). Rather, it is actually 
better than to argue that the unchanging is most likely incomposite and therefore not 
liable to be divided or dissipated, because the qualification ‘most likely’ implies the 
possibility that the unchanging is composite but nevertheless not liable to be divided 
or dissipated.27 As a result, this specific inference is not only unnecessary but also 
misleading for establishing the soul’s indivisibility. Without discussing whether the 
unchanging is incomposite or not, Socrates could more easily or reasonably have 
reached the conclusion that the soul is not liable to be disintegrated, by focusing on 
its similarity to the unchanging. 
Why, then, does Plato have Socrates take a short detour instead of saying more 
straightforwardly that the unchanging does not suffer any change, including division 
or dissipation? My answer is that Plato intends the affinity argument to make a clear 
                                                 
25 Although in conclusion Socrates uses the word ‘disintegrated’ (διαλυτῷ), this should differ little 
from ‘divided’ (διαιρεθῆναι) or ‘dissipated’ (διασκεδάννυσθαι) (cf. 78b4–c5, 80c4–5). 
26 He mentions ‘immortal’ at 79d2 as a property of Forms, but probably regards it as a property of the 
divine as well because ‘divine’ (θεῖον) is contrasted with ‘mortal’ (θνητόν) at 80a2–9. The point 
that Forms can be grasped only with the reasoning of one’s thought (τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, 
79a3) implies that they are intelligible. He also says at 78d5 that they are uniform. 
27 Cf. Rowe 1991, 471–2; 1993, 188–9. 
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contrast with Simmias’ attunement theory. The point of Socrates’ affinity argument 
is that the soul, which is similar to the invisible and divine, is analogous to the 
unchanging, which is likely to be incomposite. To this, on the other hand, Simmias 
objects that the attunement of a lyre, even if similar to the invisible and divine, is 
nonetheless comparable to the composite, because it is the specific state in which its 
strings are properly tuned. The attunement theory of the soul, as we saw above, is 
thus essentially the materialistic view that allows the soul itself to be described as 
composed of bodily elements. The idea that the soul is analogous to the composite 
therefore plays a critical role in Simmias’ objection to Socrates. 
Let us also see Simmias’ following remark when he introduces the attunement 
theory: ‘the attunement is something invisible, incorporeal, and utterly beautiful and 
divine in the tuned lyre, whereas the lyre itself and its strings are bodies, corporeal, 
composite and earthy, and akin to mortal’ (85e4–86a3). No doubt here he is picking 
up on those characters Socrates applied to the soul in the affinity argument, except 
for ‘utterly beautiful’, which I suppose he mentions to justify himself in attaching 
divinity to the attunement. It is noteworthy that ‘incomposite’ is absent from the 
predicates of the attunement, despite the presence of ‘composite’ in the opposite list. 
This must be because Simmias is about to put forward the view that the soul’s nature 
in fact lies in being composite, as opposed to Socrates’ insistence that it is 
incomposite.28 In view of this dialogical background, we can reconstruct Simmias’ 
motive for proposing the attunement theory in the following way. Listening to the 
affinity argument, Simmias conceived of the soul as equally or more similar to the 
attunement of a lyre because the attunement also shares invisibility, incorporeality 
and some divinity in the sense that beautiful sounds derive from that tuned state of 
the lyre; and he had known of the prevailing view that the soul is analogously the 
tuned state of the elements of which the body is composed; it follows from the 
affinity argument, he suspected, that the soul is more likely to be composite than 
incomposite, and will therefore be divided or dissipated after death, just as the 
attunement of a lyre is destroyed after the instrument is smashed. The point is that 
Simmias uses the analogy Socrates employed, for the purpose of establishing the 
exactly opposite conclusion that the soul is more likely to be composite. 
Remember here what Simmias says when he realizes that the attunement theory 
clashes with the recollection theory: he abandons the former because he has held it 
without any demonstration but only ‘with a sort of likelihood and outward appeal’ 
(μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας, 92d1–2). The dialogical framework we 
                                                 
28 Rowe 1993, 204. 
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have seen strongly suggests that the reason for his rejection is not that the underlying 
doctrine of some philosophical school—Pythagorean or not—has turned out to be 
less justifiable than the theory of recollection, but that the mere analogy of the soul 
to an attunement has turned out to be unlikely despite its initial attraction. We saw 
above that one of the key premises for Socrates’ affinity argument is that the 
unchanging is most likely (μάλιστα εἰκός) to be incomposite, and the changing to 
be composite (78c6–8). The inference does involve a kind of likelihood of one thing 
being another. That some analogical reasoning plays a leading role in Simmias’ 
thought is also supported by Socrates’ following statement to Simmias at 92b8–9: 
‘Attunement is not like the thing to which you are comparing it (ᾧ ἀπεικάζεις)’. 
He argues that, as long as the recollection theory is endorsed, the soul does not 
resemble an attunement, because it must have existed before entering the body, 
whereas the attunement of a lyre comes into being only after the lyre and its strings 
do. This criticism is clearly levelled at Simmias’ comparison of the soul with an 
attunement. What Simmias implies by ‘likelihood’ (εἰκός) and ‘outward appeal’ 
(εὐπρέπεια) is therefore that his endorsement of the attunement theory was 
supported by some superficial analogies rather than by profound philosophical 
teachings.29 
Now we have sufficient reason to believe that the attunement theory appealed to 
mediocre intellectuals. According to Simmias, many people believe in the 
attunement theory for the same reason as he does, namely that the soul appears 
similar to an attunement because of their shared invisibility and divinity; this 
thought process does not involve any complex reasoning but only an analogical 
conjecture. At 79e3–6, in the middle of the affinity argument, Cebes expresses how 
easy the affinity argument is to understand, by saying ‘from this approach everyone, 
even the dullest learner, would grant that soul is in every possible way more similar 
to what always stays in the same condition than to what does not.’ By ‘this 
approach’ he is surely referring to the analogical inference that the soul is similar to 
the unchanging Forms, from the agreement that they are both invisible and have an 
essential link from an epistemological point of view (79a1–e8). Although he does 
not provide such an assessment of the next section of the argument (79e9–80a9), the 
way in which Socrates infers that the soul is divine (and, as we saw above, 
unchanging) is based essentially on the same analogical reasoning as the previous 
one. Cebes’ claim of simplicity should also be true of this second analogical 
inference. 
                                                 
29 For a similar use of εὐπρέπεια, see Euthd. 305e–306c. 
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We need to notice in this regard that the affinity argument has a sophistic 
nature: it is mainly aimed at persuading people rather than at demonstrating the truth. 
At 91a1–6, in fact, Socrates himself expresses the fear that he may be acting like 
‘the utterly uneducated people’ (οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι) who do not care how things 
really are but merely strive to make their claims seem true to the audience.30 Since 
he is responding to Simmias’ and Cebes’ criticisms of the affinity argument, this 
remark should refer specifically to his attitude towards the affinity argument, which 
does not contain any compelling reasoning. For there is no guarantee, as many 
commentators point out,31 that even if a thing is similar to another, for example, in 
one respect or even more respects, it is so in another respect as well. This is, 
however, exactly the procedure Socrates follows in the affinity argument. The soul 
is similar to Forms because it is invisible, and is similar to the divine because it 
naturally rules the body; therefore, Socrates concludes, it is also similar to Forms 
and the divine in the respect of invariability, which is likely to be incomposite and 
then undivided. It is because of this lack of logical rigour that Simmias was able to 
lead the same argument to the opposite conclusion, that, because the soul shares 
invisibility and divinity with an attunement, it must be a composite of bodily 
elements, which will perish soon after the body’s destruction. 
It is reasonable to ask why, then, Socrates presents such a sophistic argument as 
to aim to produce mere persuasion, despite the fact that his leading interlocutor in 
that section is Cebes, a philosophically more cautious and advanced interlocutor. 
What deserves attention here is that Socrates himself is clearly well aware of the 
limitation of the affinity argument as a proof of immortality. He does not maintain 
that the soul is what is incapable of being disintegrated but only that it is most 
similar to such a thing; and the conclusion is also described in the way that ‘the soul 
is liable (προσήκει) to be altogether incapable of being disintegrated, or nearly so 
(ἐγγύς τι)’ (80b9–11). The verb translated as ‘is liable’ is clearly meant to weaken 
the certainty of the conclusion, namely of the soul’s inclusion among the things 
incapable of being disintegrated (cf. 78b4–c4). In view of this role of the former 
                                                 
30 Socrates goes on to say, ‘I think that now I will differ (διοίσειν) from them only to this extent: I 
won’t strive to make what I say seem true to those who are present, except as a byproduct, but instead 
to make it seem so as much as possible to myself’ (my italics, 91a6–b1). The future tense suggests 
that the arguments he is going to give, namely his criticisms of Simmias’ attunement theory and the 
final argument for immortality, are more substantial than the preceding arguments, and intended to 
demonstrate the truth seriously. But this does not imply that the recollection argument was less 
significant, because Socrates simply uses its outcome for his first criticism of the attunement theory at 
91c7–92e4. Cf. Rowe 1993, 215. 
31 Bostock 1986, 119–20; Gallop 1975, 140, 142; Rowe 1993, 189. 
Naoya Iwata: The Attunement Theory of the Soul 
 15 
qualification, on the other hand, the latter phrase, ‘or nearly so’, indicates not so 
much reservations about the argument itself as some limitations on the degree of the 
soul’s indivisibility. The soul is shown to be closest to what cannot be disintegrated 
but might still perish in the future. The addition of ‘or nearly so’ undoubtedly 
anticipates Cebes’ objection that the soul will be strong enough to wear out and 
change many bodies but might be exhausted and dissipated in the end before the last 
body. 32  It is then highly unlikely that Socrates seriously intends the affinity 
argument to constitute a proof of the soul’s immortality.33 
One might object that the affinity argument must have more philosophical 
substance than I suggest, especially in view of its connection to the theory of 
Forms.34 But I cannot see any element in the affinity argument that adds to the 
content of the theory of Forms in the dialogue. For the two features of the theory that 
are mentioned in the affinity argument are already discussed in more detail in the 
previous arguments. The first feature is that, while Forms always stay in the same 
state, particulars never do (78c10–e6). But this is the point Socrates emphasized in 
the recollection argument. 35 The second feature is that when the soul considers 
something through the body or sense-perception, it cannot grasp anything secure, but 
that when the soul considers something by itself, it can grasp stable things, namely 
Forms (79c2–d9). As Socrates himself notices at the beginning (79c2), however, he 
already made the same point earlier in the dialogue (65a9–67b6). Therefore, there is 
nothing new in the affinity argument in terms of the development of the theory of 
Forms in the dialogue. The mere use of the theory of Forms does not add any 
philosophical significance to the affinity argument. 
In contrast, I suggest, Socrates’ real motivation behind the affinity argument can 
be brought to light by looking at how he introduces the argument. Since Cebes first 
represented people’s anxiety about the soul’s dissipation at 69e5–70b4, the same 
concern has persisted among the interlocutors even after the recollection argument. 
Towards their lingering doubt, Socrates takes an unvacillating stance, saying that the 
soul’s survival after death has already been proved by combining the recollection 
                                                 
32 Sedley 1995, 15–6. 
33 Pace Apolloni 1996, who argues that the affinity argument is of at least equal philosophical merit 
than the recollection argument and the final argument. 
34 I thank the referees for raising this objection. 
35 Strictly speaking, the ‘equals’ syllogism at 74a9–c6 itself does not contain the stronger claim that 
equal particulars never stay in the same state, but only the weaker one that they sometimes appear 
unequal. But we can see that Socrates is advancing the strong claim in the recollection argument, 
from his repeated claims that we think of all equal particulars as falling short of the Form of the 
Equal (75a1–3, a9–b2, b6–8; cf. 76d9–e1). 
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argument with the preceding, cyclical argument (77c6–d5). Thus, he characterizes 
their anxiety about death as a childish fear. In response, however, Cebes asks him to 
convince not themselves but a child inside them, who fears death as if it were a 
bogeyman; Socrates therefore takes on the job of chanting spells (ἐπᾴδειν) in order 
for them to chant it away (77d5–e10). This is how he introduces the affinity 
argument, which is clearly aimed at persuading less philosophical minds, ironically 
compared to scared children. And it is such an enchanting argument that Simmias 
uses for the purpose of advocating the attunement theory and inferring the death of 
the soul. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
I hope that the observation so far has shown that Simmias’ attunement theory of 
the soul is not of Pythagorean origin but derived from a materialistic world view that 
had become widespread at that time, and that it attracted many (probably young) 
informed people because of its appeal to such simple analogical reasoning as 
represented in Socrates’ affinity argument. I have argued that Plato intends the 
affinity argument to pave the way for introducing Simmias’ counterargument by 
means of the attunement theory. Those two arguments, as we saw above, have the 
same structure and the opposite conclusions: Socrates argues that because the soul is 
similar to the invisible and divine, it will be incomposite and imperishable, whereas 
Simmias argues that for exactly the same reason, it will be composite and perishable. 
The pair of those two arguments surely anticipate Socrates’ later warning 
against misology at 89d1–90d8, which is said to start sneaking in when one believes 
an argument to be true and finds it to be false later.36 This connection is made clear 
by seeing Phaedo’s report at 88c1–7 about what happened to Socrates’ interlocutors 
who have just listened to Simmias’ and Cebes’ objections. Phaedo says that the 
interlocutors were firmly persuaded by the affinity argument, but that they have 
plummeted into doubt again because of those objections, so that they have become 
doubtful about not only any argument for immortality and other things but also the 
very facts of the matter. Plato’s implicit message here would thus be that the affinity 
argument and Simmias’ counterargument are perfect examples of arguments so 
disputatious (ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους, 90c1) as to cause misology, and therefore 
that those who naively believe in the attunement theory are on the verge of falling 
into that danger, unless they acquire expertise in arguments like Socrates, who 
                                                 
36 Cf. Elton 1997, 316; Rowe 1991, 475–6. 
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presented the affinity argument with full understanding of its proper purpose and 
limit. 
This leads to my final point that Plato directs Socrates’ criticisms of the 
attunement theory at not only Simmias and the other interlocutors but also 
contemporary readers of the dialogue. I have argued that Simmias represents a 
prevailing, materialistic view of the world that ultimately leads to doubt about the 
separability of the soul from the body after death. Plato’s thought would have been 
that there were many potential attunement theorists in those days, and that the 
powerful attraction of the theory had had so negative impacts on them as to lead 
many to disbelief in immortality, misology and so on. This gives an alternative 
account of why at 88d3–6 he describes Echecrates as an enthusiastic follower of the 
attunement theory. It is not because he was a Pythagorean but because, I suggest, he 
was meant to present the position of contemporary readers of the dialogue. The 
attunement theory would have been so influential, and Plato would therefore have 
needed to tackle it before putting forward the final argument of the dialogue that the 
soul is immortal.37 
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